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This thesis goes through the known methods of NFC utilising contactless payment and the 
security issues and threats of each specific device or method. The thesis will cover the 
known in use devices in Finland and the methods for each device. The technology and ori-
gins of NFC is also explained in detail, as well as the protocols standards and Android de-
velopment tools constantly keeping in focus the aspects that affect security. The thesis 
also includes two researches and the goal of the thesis is to map the security threats there 
are in NFC utilising contactless payment.  
 
This thesis is conducted without a financial supporter, but the results will be forwarded to 
any party that might benefit from the results of the research. 
 
The thesis does not handle or analyse any other forms of contactless payment other than 
those that utilise NFC technology. This means that even though some applications i.e. Mo-
bile Pay are mentioned, they are not analysed or taken in count when defining the results 
of the research.  
 
The sources and materials used in this thesis consists of previous studies, tests and arti-
cles, technology and component descriptions, a survey conducted via internet survey plat-
form and personal tests and reports. Unfortunately, no reliable book source on the subject 
is available (for the information is either expired or irrelevant for this thesis). I have also 
used statements of bank personnel and representatives that have commented on NFC se-
curity issues during the last few years. 
 
Research indicated that are some serious security threats in contactless payment methods 
that are not that well known for the public and for banks. There might be a possibility that 
some risks are known by banks and card companies but are chosen to be left uncom-
mented for there are no easy answers. It was also found out that even though your “ordi-
nary user” is not aware of the specific threats and factors, contactless payment is still not 
thought of as a 100% safe option but rather a concerningly unsecure one. The comments 
from bank representatives also revealed little about the safety aspect knowledge of the 
banks.  
 
For the question, what can be done to prevent falling a victim to the explained attack sce-
narios in this thesis I found out some answers, but most of the results depend on either 
personal awareness or physical protection. The application side, as in any type of IT-secu-
rity is hard to develop because the faster development of exploitation schemes in correla-
tion to security solutions. 
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1 Introduction 
In my thesis about NFC payment and security threats I will go through the basic technol-
ogy and devices that are used in NFC payment and the known forms of security risks. The 
thesis was conducted single handedly by me, meaning that there were no sponsors in-
volved. As for the objectives of the thesis I set out to research what is the current state of 
security in paying with NFC in Finland and in some parts the world and also what is the 
overall stance towards the security of NFC payment of the average end user. I also set an 
alternative or additional objective depending of the results to: what can be done to en-
hance the security of NFC Payment? As for the research problem of my thesis I altered it 
once again depending on the results but with the assumption that there are some serious 
risks in NFC security. The research problem could be described as: how safe is NFC pay-
ment and how aware are people and bank representatives about them? Which I then 
started to unravel using quantitative survey analysis and case studies and interviews. The 
research problems in my thesis were the rapidly outdating information and in some as-
pects bank secrecy agreements.  
 
The thesis starts with descriptions of all devices that are NFC paying enabled such as 
bank cards and mobile phones. Then the technology and the origins of NFC is explained 
in detail with the full descriptions of the NFC modes and protocols and standards. I also 
go through some of the main features in the NCI android development stack to give the 
reader awareness of the android technology before I go through some attack scenarios 
that have the android stack playing the main role. Once the technology is thoroughly ex-
plained the thesis will cover all the most known attack methods and security threats, siting 
results from previous tests and studies as we go and offering visual aid to understand the 
course of each attack and what needs to have happened in what order for each attack to 
be successful from the attacker’s perspective. This covers the theory part of the thesis, 
then we move on to the research.  
 
In the research part I have a walkthrough of a survey I conducted which aimed to map 
how ordinary users of NFC payment feel about the security aspects of it. After analysing 
the results, I aimed to explain the results through careful assessment of various news sto-
ries in the past few years, the comments and publishes of security professionals, the com-
ments and publishes of officials such as VISA and bank representatives and my own ex-
periences and tests. Three cases are then gone through to support the claims and results.  
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In addition to the survey research I also interviewed a few colleagues of mine from Nordea 
bank, some in the developing process of the NFC technology utilizing mobile phone appli-
cation Nordea Pay and some as a part of the survey research. Bank secrecy agreement 
restrained the technical analysis of the application but the discussions were supportive to 
my research and offered the most up to date opinions from an expert in my thesis. I con-
clude the thesis with a recap of the findings and ponder upon the future of NFC payment 
in Finland. 
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1.1 Terminology  
The most used terms explained, to help the reader understand what the subject is: 
- NFC = Near Field Communication, a determined set of communication protocols 
that utilize RFID technology. NFC is its own technology as well. 
 
- RFID = Radio Frequency Identification, the technology invented in the 80’s from 
which NFC is built from. 
 
- NFC Tag = A smart chip that allows reading and or writing via NFC.  
 
- NFC Antenna = A NFC utilising circuit built in a device, works like a chip with some 
alterations. 
 
- NFC Mode = Devices and tags can have 3 different modes, like read/write, emula-
tion etc. a mode defines what the NFC device does. 
 
- Contactless Payment = A payment method that uses NFC technology 
 
- POS = Point of Sale, a device that charges a NFC payment device 
 
- Bluetooth = a wireless technology standard for exchanging data. 
 
- Wi-Fi = Technology for wireless local area networking with devices 
 
- GRPS = A digital mobile telephone technology that allows data transmission 
 
- EDGE = Same as above, but with enhancements in speed and performance 
 
- PCD = Proximity Coupling Device, can be an any NFC enabled device such as a 
smart phone 
 
- PICC = Proximity Integrated Circuit Cards is usually a NFC tag or a sticker. 
 
- NFC Forum = A non-profit organisation dedicated to developing NFC technology 
and Standards.  
 
- Protocol = A special set of rules and end points 
 
- Standard = a special set of protocols and communication methods and technology 
set as standard.  
 
All other and some of these terms are explained in detail in the rest of the thesis text. All 
terms are also explained in a chronical order so that no term is explained after an exam-
ple, but always beforehand.  
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2 Contactless Payment Devices 
Contactless payments are made possible with NFC. NFC or Near Field Communication is 
a determined set of communication protocols that utilizes RFID technology to verify the 
connection between two devices. Usually the other device being a mobile phone or a bank 
card and the other device a stationary reader of sorts. The term “contactless payment” is 
used in several different instances so in this chapter I will go through the most known and 
most widely used devices in Finland that use contactless payment.  
2.1 Bank cards  
Probably the most common and everyday device that uses NFC as a payment method is 
the average debit or credit card. Most Finnish banks offer their customers a chance to add 
the contactless payment feature to his or hers card of choice and pay small shopping’s 
with the card. The obvious advantage of the contactless payment method in bank cards is 
that the end user does not have to type in the pin code when the overall sum of the pur-
chase is under 25€. (Nordea 2017). 
 
All the cards and the devices that support contactless payment have the signature logo on 
them, that is formed of 4 curved waves as such: 
 
  
(Figure 1. The contactless payment logo, dynatracker.de 2016) 
 
The contactless payment is at the moment available only for debit or credit cards that are 
not partnership cards such as Stockmann MasterCard or Finnair MasterCard, although 
they might become available soon as well. Also, the Visa Electron card does not support 
contactless payment technology because of its instant verifying technology. (Nordea 
2017).  
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(Figures 2 & 3. Contactless Payments with the two most commonly used readers in Fin-
land. Sv-oy & lansi-savo 2016) 
 
2.1.1 The Card Types 
 Debit card – A debit card is a payment card that charges the sum of the users pur-
chases straight from the user’s bank account. Debit cards do not have a credit op-
tion. The charging of the user’s bank account does not happen instantly and there 
might be a 1 to 3-day delay between the purchase and the charge from the ac-
count so it is practically possible for a debit card user to exceed the limit on the 
bank account which results in the balance being negative. 
 
 Credit card – A credit card is a payment card that does not charge the customers 
bank account but the credit account that the bank of the customer has granted. 
Usual credit providers are Master Card, Visa, Amex etc. so the credit risk of the 
bank is minimal. In most common cases the customer has a 30-day payment time 
without interest on the purchases made via credit cards, but the credit account has 
its own expenses such as: the banks own marginal interest added to a 3- 12 
month euribor interest, service fees and the invoicing fees. Credit card users can 
pay their used limit in parts (usually min. 5% of used total) but the owners of pay-
ment time cards must pay the entire used sum after the 30-day interest fee period. 
 
 Electron card – As mentioned earlier the electron card is much like the debit card 
in the fashion that it charges the purchases from the user’s bank account. The only 
and the major difference is that the electron card requires an internet connection to 
work properly because there is no delay between the purchase and the charging. 
 
 Credit/Debit card – A credit/debit card is the combination of Debit and Credit cards. 
It possesses the features of both cards in one. When paying with a credit/debit 
card the user chooses which side to use before entering the pin code. As a default 
setting when using a combination card for contactless payment the charge is made 
from the debit side.  
 
 
(Figures 4-7. In order: debit, credit, electron and the combination cards by Nordea. 
Nordea 2017) 
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2.2 Mobile phones 
The earliest forms of mobile payments worked in a way where the sum of the purchase 
was added to the subscription owners mobile bill. With development of NFC add on de-
vices, NFC stickers and built-in NFC tags the forms of mobile paying have increased. In 
addition, with the latter forms of mobile payment some applications offer payment options 
as well, such as mobile pay, ABC-mobiilitankkaus etc. Since we are considering the forms 
of contactless payment and in particular NFC payments I’m going to through some key 
factors in NFC payments with mobile devices and methods.  
2.2.1 Mobile phone devices 
Today there’s a lot more mobile phone brands than there were in the golden 90’s and 
early 2000’s so I’m not going to list them all in here. Basically, a good ground rule is that 
most if not all android phones have a NFC antenna built inside. For example, Apple 
phones, do not support NFC, for they have developed their own EMV Payment Tokenisa-
tion Specification. (Apple 2017). Most mobile phones have a logo or the text Near Field 
Communication on the battery to tell about the availability and the user can also find out 
about it in the phone menu as such: (Weebly 2017)  
 
   
(Figures: 8-9 The menu of an android phone (Oneplus 3T) and a Samsung Battery. Own 
screenshot & Weebly 2016) 
In order to turn the NFC option on, the user only needs to enable it from the phones 
menu. In addition to the android phones, also Nokia’s Microsoft and Lumia phones also 
had the NFC antenna built inside.  To be more technical, in the android NFC stack there 
are two implementations of a built-in NFC chip available. The models are “libnfc-nxp” and 
“libnfc-nci” (J. Vila & R.J. Rodriguez 2015). 
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2.2.2 Tablets and Laptops 
Some laptops and tablet devices also have a NFC antenna built inside, but in those cases 
the format is to read for example a card or another NFC device and they aren’t used as 
the actual paying or checking in device. Most laptops and tablets that have NFC technol-
ogy utilize the technology for reading other NFC utilizing devices like id cards for identifi-
cation, travel cards for topping up the value like the Oyster card or HSL card. It’s also 
common that NFC is used for data transfer, but for that purpose it’s really slow and can be 
awkward. (Weebly 2017). 
 
 
3 The Technology 
3.1 NFC Technology 
Near Field Communication is a similar type of wireless communication form as Bluetooth 
and Wi-Fi. The exception is that the range is a lot smaller and the form of communication 
is done by sending and receiving radio waves. NFC originated from the RFID technology 
invented in 1983 by Charles Walton (Google patent registry 2017) which in a way it also 
utilizes today. RFID stands for Radio Frequency Identifier. Basically “NFC is similar tech-
nology, but standardized for consumer smartphones” (Matt Egan 12.5.2015). What Matt is 
referring to is that RFID technology is widely used in warehouses and stores where the 
worker can scan the contents of a cargo box utilizing RFID in other words, in industries.  
 
NFC works with electromagnetic induction by making a connection between two devices 
via radio frequency running at 13.56 megahertz. The radius of the devices can be a maxi-
mum of 3-4cm and the connection, unlike for the RFID which only reads information the 
NFC has also a read and write connection. So, the communication can go both ways. The 
connection speed when it comes to data transfer is 106.2kb/s, 212kb/s or 424kb/s which 
in internet broadband speeds is relatively slow but in data communication sufficient. The 
speed is approximately the same as the standard GRPS (30-114kb/s) or EDGE (80 – 
236.8kb/s) network speeds. In the NFC data transfer protocol, there always must be two 
devices and two modes active: the initiator and the target, where the initiator is the active 
party during the whole data transfer process and the target remains passive. Since NFC 
can send electric currents the passive party does not need to have any energy or a power 
source whatsoever.  
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3.1.1 NFC Modes 
NFC devices that are fully compatible can operate in three different modes:  
 Read/Write mode: 
 
The mode is used for embedded NFC tags like in posters or labels. The functional-
ity is pretty similar to QR-codes, but utilizing the NFC technology. In this mode, the 
reading NFC device reads stored data from the tag. 
 
 Peer-to-Peer: 
 
Is used for when two devices communicate with each other and transfer data. A 
good example of this is when a person who buys a new android phone wants to 
transfer all the information from the old phone to the new phone he can activate 
the NFC on from both “peers” and perform the data transfer 
 
 Card Emulation 
 
Card emulation enables the NFC device to act as a card, such as a bank card or a 
travelling card etc. When it comes to NFC payments with devices other than actual 
bank cards, this is the most common mode. (Cameron Faulkner 2015) 
 
In total, there are also two main NFC elements which are: Proximity Coupling Device or 
PCD this can be an any NFC enabled device such as a smart phone. And Proximity Inte-
grated Circuit Cards or PICC which is usually a NFC tag or a sticker You will find out more 
about the tags and stickers later from the “beer festival” example.  
 
3.1.2 NFC Protocols and the Protocol Stack 
The NFC protocols can be described as a complex set. Even though for the end user NFC 
as a technology is great, for the developer it can be a nightmare. Historically there’s been 
multiple different developers generating their own specifications and compatibilities during 
the last twenty odd years, which for today has resulted in incompatibilities and multiplicity 
of pre-existing tags and features. 
 
The communication protocols and data exchange format standards in NFC are based on 
the RFID standards. The Standards are loosely defined by the non-profit organization 
NFC Forum which was formed by Philips, Nokia and Sony in 2004. The protocols used in 
NFC protocol stack are: Topaz protocol, MiFARE and MiFARE ultralight protocols, LLCP 
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protocol and the ISO 14443 A-4 and B-4 anti-collision protocols. As for the standards, the 
NFC uses ISO 14443 A-2 / ISO 18092 and ISO 14443 A-1 / ISO 18092 standards. The 
exception in the stack as mentioned earlier on manufacturer specific uniqueness’s is the 
Sony’s FeliCa protocol model, FeliCa is a RFID smart card reader system.  These stand-
ards specify the whole of NFC process and details from modulation schemes, transfer 
speeds, frame formats, coding and the conditions for data collision control. 
 
The protocols vary depending on the platforms and the NFC mode in use, which also de-
fines what NFC tags are used. In total, there are 5 different types of tags which are used 
for different vendor’s products and vendor specific protocols. Each type of tag has its own 
capabilities and restrictions that affect the use of memory, messaging and maximum size 
etc. In addition to the pre-existing standards there has been new protocols and formats 
developed.  
 
For example, the most simplistic NFC mode the card modulation should send and receive 
information, in this case at least a unique flag or an id. For this purpose, the NFC Forum 
has developed a data format called NDEF or NFC Data Exchange Format. The NDEF can 
store and transport any ASCII, MIME (any other data then text for example), URL’s and 
such.  And for the card emulation mode the NFC developed a NDEF Exchange Protocol 
or SNEP to specifically allow the receiving and sending of messages between two differ-
ent NFC devices. As in modern day business the NDEF and SNEP were developed to 
simplify the transfer protocols.  
 
Basically, the NFC protocol stack is so confusing because there are so many different 
types of pre-existing protocols that have been implied and almost none of them work with 
each other. For example, android doesn’t support LLCP level via API but it supports 
SNEP API etc.  
 
(Figure 10: The NFC Protocol Stack Wikipedia 2017) 
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3.1.3 Tag and Product Explanations 
 Type 1 Topaz – Type 1 tags use a topaz protocol. There are two memory models 
for it to use, either a static memory mode for tags that have memory size less than 
120 bytes or dynamic mode for tags that have larger memory. Bytes are written by 
simple commands like WRITE-NE, WRITE-E8, READ, RALL etc. 
 
 MiFARE Classic – MiFARE classic or old tags are basically for storage devices. 
The original security controls were broken in 2007 which resulted to MiFARE clas-
sic not being used that much anymore.   
 
 Type 2 MiFARE Ultralight – Action wise similar to type 1 tags with the exception 
that when the tag has less than 64 bytes available it uses static mode and other-
wise the dynamic mode. The first 16 bytes of memory is always meant for 
metadata such as access rights etc. READ and WRITE actions are used to access 
data.  
 
 Type 3 – Type 3 tags are very rare; the only known exception was the manufac-
turer built Sony FeliCa which is mainly used for access points such as work places 
etc.  
 
 Type 4 DESFire – Type 4 tags always contain at least two files, the CC or the ca-
pability container and the NDEF or NFC Data Exchange Format file. The tag is de-
signed to fill the purpose of reading the CC file which then tells it what to do with 
NDEF file. Commands are SQL influenced like “Select, ReadBinary, Up-
dateBinary”.  
 
 LLCP Peer 2 Peer – Logical Link Control Protocol works in a very different and 
more intelligent way than the previously mentioned modes and tags. In the previ-
ous versions, there has always basically just been a read / write operation, when 
the LLCP protocol is for connecting two communicating devices and maintaining 
the connection even if there are no packages being sent or received. It can per-
form a connectionless or a connection orientated connection using commands 
such as CONNECT. There are also some variations to different kinds of LLCP’s.  
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3.1.4 Example: ISO 14443 standard 
The ISO/IEC 14443 standard is used mainly for the most common NFC Payment type: 
Contactless payment cards. The standard is a 4-part international standard for all contact-
less smartcards. The four parts define such factors like: data transmission protocols, RF 
power and signalling schemes, Initialization and the anti-collision protocols and the size 
and characteristics of the packages.  
 
 
(Figure 11 the ISO/IEC 14443 stack. Protocolbench 2017) 
 
3.1.5 Android NFC stack 
At this point of the thesis it is important to look in to the android NFC architecture and 
stack, for this information is very useful later when describing attack scenarios and meth-
ods. As mentioned earlier the NFC chip built inside the android device determines the na-
tive implementation that is in use. These two native implementations are:  
 
- libnfc-nxp (NXP) - NXP is an implementation that provides support only for NXP 
PN54x controllers in the NFC architecture as well as NXP MiFARE products, but 
due their rarity and the specific transmission protocol it is not that widely used. 
 
- libnfc-nci (NCI) – NCI provides support for any NFC Controller Interface compliant 
chips. NCI is also more widely used today because it has very little limitations con-
cerning chip families and it provides an open interface between the NFC Controller 
and device host. 
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The NCI is widely supported as the standard by the NFC Forum, the non-profit organiza-
tion mentioned earlier. This widely because NCI specifications aim to cut down the com-
patibility problems and make the NFC chip integrate with as many as possible manufac-
turers devices with a standardised level of performance. In a way, you could call it the 
“open source” of NFC development. “It also provides a logical interface that can be used 
over different physical channels, such as UART, SPI, and I2C.” (J. Vila & J. Rodriguez 
2015). Other notable facts about what lead to the NFC forums favoring of the NCI are for 
example Google deciding to use it in its latest models of Nexus phones and the overall 
performance between NFCEE’s (NFC Execution Environment) and connectivity through 
RF channels.  The NCI NFC developer framework also allows the use of C++, C and Java 
across platforms so the diversity has lots of advantages over NXP.  
 
 
(Figure 12 the NCI communication form. J. Vila & J. Rodriguez 2015) 
 
NFC Technology is constantly being developed into more complex and more secure it 
wise, but the foundations are in the RFID technology developed in the 80’s. On hardware 
level the development is slow paced comparing to the software level. It is though in the 
software level that the security issues can more effectively be tackled. The sole NFC 
pieces of technology have very little safety aspects or features built in and the perfor-
mance depends entirely on the mode a PCD or PICC is set at. It is the constant battle be-
tween the exploiters and those who work to enhance security on the software level that 
define the safety of NFC and especially NFC Payment Methods. In the following chapters 
the thesis will go through known security issues, known cases, experiments (of my own 
and ones that are already done) and conduct a research of the public knowledge about 
NFC security measured through an open survey.  
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4 NFC Security Threats & Methods 
In this chapter I will go through the most common un-imaginary NFC security threats, 
which have example cases and have been done. I will also play around with some theo-
ries that security specialists have come up with. As it always is in IT-security the crooks 
are one step ahead of the security authorities, so in that sense of thinking it’s not at all 
farfetched to consider the threats that have not yet been conducted, but which may be 
possible to conduct in the future.  
 
4.1 Debit/Credit Card Data Theft 
Probably one of the most feared actual forms of attack which enables the largest profit for 
the attacker and the largest loss for the victim. This form of crime was very visible in the 
headlines in February 2017 with front page news stories by: “Ilta-Sanomat, Iltalehti and 
Helsingin Sanomat”. (IS 2017). The technology and method for credit card theft is rather 
simple because of the security gaps in the NFC safety.  
 
This form of security threat can lead to loss of credit, data corruption, spoofing and man-
in-the-middle attacks as said by cyber security expert Pierluigi Paganini (Security affairs 
2015). For the attack to be successful the attacker would need two devices: an android 
phone with NFC and a card reader that can charge money like the ones talked about ear-
lier in the “NFC devices chapter” and a victim.  
4.1.1 The Attack Scenario 
As tested by Pierluigi Paganini in 2015 the attacker needs the two devices talked about 
earlier which in more detail are: PoS device with GRPS and NFC Support and should 
make sure that the android device is running Android 4.4 KitKat interface or a newer ver-
sion. First the attacker launches a relay attack, which is a form of hacking related to the 
man-in-the-middle. The relay attacks purpose is to manipulate the communications be-
tween two parties in this case the victims phone and credit card. Pierluigi describes that 
the concept in use is the “the honest prover, the honest verifier, the dishonest prover, the 
dishonest verifier” (Security Affairs 2015). In this case the dishonest communicators are 
used to trick the honest ones. To assign the roles to actual items: The mobile of the victim 
is the dishonest verifier, the attackers mobile is the dishonest prover, the portable pay-
ment reader is the honest verifier and the victims credit card is the honest prover. Now at 
this phase it’s good to be clear that this sort of attack requires very specific circumstances 
to “work” but I will go through the technical details after the timeline description of the at-
tack.  
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(Figure 13 the devices and roles Security Affairs 2015) 
 
Once the victim is selected after the environment scan and the successful relay attack, the 
next step is to make the victim download an app specifically designed to scan the near 
(NFC) area around the infected mobile phone.  There’s two ways to make the victim 
download the app, one of which per google (IS 2017) has been patched. One way is to in-
fect the victims mobile with a Trojan virus that will force download the app to the mobile, 
or use similar techniques that are used in the phishing form of hacking. In this case per-
suade or trick the user to accept the apps download manually. All of this done through the 
previously formed connection. 
 
 
(Figure 14 the timeline of the relay attack used for copying a MasterCard using two an-
droid devices and a PoS-machine. V = verifier, P = Prover. Hitb-Conference 2015) 
 
Once the app is downloaded the app starts to scan the surrounding areas. In this phase 
for the attack to be successful the victim’s mobile needs to be close to the victim’s wallet 
that has the credit card inside of it. If the app recognises that there is a credit card in the 
close proximity of the mobile it uses the previously formed connection to send a notifica-
tion to the attacker’s smart phone. At this phase since the app has copied the credit card 
credentials the attackers mobile phone acts as a credit card replica and the now the at-
tacker can just use it for the PoS machine and start making numerous 25€ - 100€ transac-
tions depending on the card of the victim. In Finland, the sum would be >25€.  
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4.1.2 Analysis & Protection 
At the moment, it would seem that NFC technology for payments is being pushed to the 
markets faster than the security requirements are met. Such is the case with relay attacks 
as well. As researchers Jose Vila and Ricardo J. Rodriguez stated in their research “Un-
like eavesdropping or data modification, relay attacks are a threat that may bypass secu-
rity countermeasures, such as identification of communication parties or cryptography 
schemes.” (Hitb-Conference 2015). To put some facts on the table, “nfcworld.com” pre-
dicted that in 2019 there will be over 500 million NFC users worldwide and almost 300 dif-
ferent mobile phone models available that use NFC technology. The explosive growth in 
the technology available has also created such security risks as this scenario. Even 
though the current NFC payment rules only allow 25€ to 100€ transactions, the attacker 
has time to conduct numerous charges before the PIN code is required. And that alone 
makes it a serious risks, at least when the attacks are being made on a large scale. 
 
4.2 Eavesdropping  
 
Eavesdropping is a method of an attack that does not necessarily focus on stealing infor-
mation or personal or financial damage for the victim. An eavesdropping attack can be 
used to disrupt and block communications between two NFC devices or to corrupt the 
data that is meant to be transferred between the devices. In that sense an eavesdropping 
attack can also very much remind of a DoS-attack (denial of service) where the main goal 
of the attacker is to make the wanted transaction or communication unavailable.  For the 
attack to be successful the attacker must be able to break the secure channel between 
the two devices using encryption methods and the device used for the attack must be in 
somewhat close proximity. This kind of attack could well bring chaos to event holders if 
NFC is the main method to buy the tickets or the tickets themselves only use NFC tech-
nology. The risk for the attacker is that the proximity factor makes it riskier and the at-
tacker can be potentially easily recognized.  
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(Figure 15 Eavesdropping attack scenario INFOSEC Institute P. Pagani 2015). 
 
4.3 Data Modification & Data Corruption 
Data modification is very similar to eavesdropping and eavesdropping is basically the 
same as data corruption. In a data modification attack the difference is that the data that is 
being exchanged between two devices is to be modified in order to benefit the attacker. 
The way it works is that the attacker can use a RFID jammer to briefly exchange data and 
to alter the binary coding of the original exchange. Researcher P. Pagani describes “This 
type of attack is very difficult to implement but the data modification is realizable in rare 
cases” (P. Pagani 2015). He tells in his study that the way to notice an attack of this sort is 
to introduce a code to the NFC device that measures the strength of the frequencies “thus 
choosing the one that is truly the closest and most likely valid”. (P. Pagani 2015). Even 
though a data modification attack is incredibly hard to notice for a regular end user it also 
extremely hard to conduct. There are many factors that need meet as stated by research-
ers Ernst Haselsteiner and Klemens Breitfuß in their paper “Security in Near Field Com-
munication (NFC) – Strengths and Weaknesses” (2013).: 
 
 The strength of the amplitude modulation 
 Transferring data with Miller coding, only certain bits can be modified. 
 Transferring Manchester-encoded data with a modulation ratio of 10% permits the 
modification of all bits.  
 
Unlike in your standard MITM credit card theft attack scenario, for data modification the 
attacker needs to be very skilled in many aspects to conduct a successful attack.  
  
17 
4.4 NFC Protocol Stack Fuzzing & Android NFC Stack Bug 
The NFC stack fuzzing attack is done by the attacker’s interception of the communication 
between the victim’s device and the NFC protocol stack. The attack is very unlikely to be 
successful but in theory if succeeded the attacker could exploit ordinary NFC operations 
such as purchases at the cashier or agency. The attacker needs either to be in close prox-
imity or an antenna to do a NFC protocol stack fuzzing attack. There are also other ex-
ploits to fuzzing attacks that could end in the attacker having total control of the victim’s 
phone through NFC. As Pierluigi Pagani states when describing fuzzing, the attackers 
NFC device: “… analyses the software that is built on top of the NFC stack for victims’ de-
vices.” He then continues to describe the full effect an attack can have:” An attacker can 
force some mobile devices to parse images, videos, contacts, office documents, and even 
any other content without user interaction.” Other actions that the attacker can do include 
making phone calls and texting, which also is a major security risk given that the attacker 
might have a pay-per-call number that charges the victim drastic sums when dialled.  
 
Android NFC Stack bug works in a rather similar way but with few exceptions.  An Ameri-
can hacker Charlie Miller published a proof of concept “Exploring the NFC attack surface” 
in 2012 where he made several attacks to various android phones in various ways. One 
described method the NFC stack bug works in a way where the attacker exploits the flaws 
in the phones Bluetooth pairing settings and the victim scanning a NFC tag that the at-
tacker has planted.  
In this case Charlie used a Nokia N9 mobile phone with NFC enabled to connect to the 
phone. The attacker sends a NDEF message to the victim’s phone, in it’s all simplicity 
something like the following:  
 
[0000] d4 0c 27 6e 6f 6b 69 61 2e 63 6f 6d 3a 62 74 01 ..’nokia.com:bt. 
[0010] 00 1d 4f 92 90 e2 20 04 18 31 32 33 34 00 00 00 ..O… ..1234… 
[0020] 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0c 54 65 73 74 20 6d ……….Test m 
[0030] 61 63 62 6f 6f 6b acbook (Charlie Miller 2012). 
 
Charlie describes the test message as following: ““In this message, a PIN is given as 
“1234”, a Bluetooth address, and a name of the device are also provided. Once paired, it 
is possible to use tools such as obexfs, gsmsendsms, or xgnokii to perform actions with 
the device.” (Charlie Miller 2012). And what it means translated is that the attacker has the 
total control of the victim’s phone without the victim even knowing about it.  
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(Figure 16 The fuzzing scenario and fuzzing attack setup Charlie Miller 2012). 
 
In the figure 16 on the right we can see the layers of the NFC protocol stack where the 
NFC fuzzing attack concentrates in and on the left, we can see how simple hardware wise 
a setup for a fuzzing attack can be. The setup is the one Charlie Miller used in his experi-
ments in 2012.  
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5 Study One – The Survey 
I conducted a research in the form of a survey about how do ordinary consumers use NFC 
payment methods and how safe do they think that NFC payment methods are. The re-
search was orchestrated in a quantitative method, and before the survey started I set a 
limit of at least 50 answers needed to the survey to get a proper result. In research terms 
a survey is “a brief interview or a discussion with individuals about a specific topic”. 
(Study.com 2017). The goal of this and any survey is to collect a passible amount of infor-
mation concerning the chosen topic. The survey itself was done so it would be fast to do 
and to get specific answers, the simplicity of the survey was so that as many as possible 
people would complete it. From my previous experiences, I determined that on average 
people lose interest quickly and a long dragging survey would cost me some answers.   
 
The survey was done via internet survey platform called “surveymonkey.com” and all the 
analysis was done on excel and other analysis tools. The latter was because of the sur-
veymonkey.com websites free and premium subscription options of which the latter 
would’ve demand a 20€ fee, so I went with the free one. The platform is in Finnish as well 
as the questions I conducted to the survey, I felt it was necessary for most of my friends 
aren’t that familiar with NFC or especially NFC in English. The survey consists of six ques-
tions, each question having multiple choice answers, some questions with multiple options 
and some having a free form text field where the surveyors could type in something rele-
vant that wasn’t on the pre-determined answers.  
 
The survey was online between the 9th of March and the survey was locked on the 15th of 
March. During the time period the survey got 58 answers. The survey could be found from 
a link which I shared on various social media platforms including WhatsApp, Facebook 
and Twitter. The survey itself was IP coded, so that one person could only submit one set 
of answers through one IP address. The geological distribution of the people who an-
swered the questions located between Oulu and Helsinki. Because of the language barrier 
there were no answerers from outside Finland. This chapter will be divided in to seven 
parts; each question has its own section and the conclusion has the final section. I also 
gathered graphs and data from the survey which I will present on this chapter as well. Fig-
ures are entirely in Finnish so translations are found from the text.  
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5.1 Question one – Which forms of close contact payment have you used? 
The first question was conducted to map all the different payment methods the people 
use. The options were: debit/credit cards, mobile phone and apps, tablet device, NFC on 
a computer and using a RFID reader.  
 
5.1.1 Analysis of the results  
The answers were expected and the distribution between the answers very low. 89.09% 
of the people who answered the question chose debit/credit card, which seems to be the 
most used form. What surprised me a little bit was the popularity of different mobile phone 
apps and NFC payments. In total 54.55% of the people who answered use mobile paying 
methods as well. On the bottom of the barrel was RFID readers which probably due to its 
incredibly hard to buy nature no one chose as the answer. This question also had a free 
form field where one could specify if any other form of close contact payment is in use. 
Only one free form answer was submitted, roughly translated “I would use it on my debit 
card but my bank does not offer the option”.  
 
 
(Figure 17 Question 1) 
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5.2 Question Two -  How often do you use contactless payment? 
The second question was conducted to map the frequency of the using of contactless 
payment methods amongst the answerers. The options given: Never, 1-3 times a month, 
1-6 times a week, once a day or more than one time per day. The answerers were also 
guided to use their best judgement on the answers and estimate the average of their use. 
In this question the person answering could only choose one option.  
 
5.2.1 Analysis of the results 
There was a decent distribution amongst the answers, the most common options chosen 
was 1-6 times a week with a share of 46,55% people choosing the option. One noticeable 
factor was that 4 people chose the option never which made some questions irrelevant for 
them. There was an exact equal share of people who chose the option 1-3 times a month 
and those who chose more than one time a day.  
 
 
(Figure 18 Question 2) 
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5.3 Question Three – Where do you use contactless payment? 
This question was conducted to start mapping the security matters. I think it’s relevant 
where do people use NFC payment methods for it correlates to what people think are the 
safe places to use it. In this question the options are: Grocery stores, Agencies, Restau-
rants, Pubs and nightclubs, self-service automates and vending machines or all the 
above. On my behalf, it must be said that the all the above option could’ve been left out 
since it distorts the results but luckily only one answerer chose that option. In this question 
the answerer could choose multiple answers. There was also an option to write on a free 
form field as “other” option.  
5.3.1 Analysis of the results 
A whopping 88.24% of the people who answered chose grocery stores as the payment lo-
cation of choice, closely followed with restaurants 64.71% and pubs and nightclubs with 
54.90%. Agencies were the least chosen option and I can say from my own experience 
that that might be due to the lack of the option when considering agencies like the police 
station, public transport agency etc. On the free form fields, there were 10 answers and 
the answers varied between: “Workplace cafeteria” which would have fallen under the res-
taurants category and transfers between friends which can be done using NFC and an ap-
propriate app.  
 
(Figure 19 Question Three) 
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5.4 Question Four – Does the model of the reader make a difference security-
vice? 
This question was conducted to gather information about how do people feel about the dif-
ferent payment readers and their security aspects. For example, a solid mounted reader 
that you would find from a grocery store, might to some feel a lot more secure than a mo-
bile reader that you would use when paying the pizza delivery clerk or an outdoor bar-
tender. There were only two options on this question and only one option could be cho-
sen.  
 
5.4.1 Analysis of the results 
The results were almost fifty-fifty but not quite. 37.93% of the people answered felt like 
there is a difference in the security between a mobile and mounted NFC readers and 
62.07% felt like there was no difference. When I was considering whether to add this 
question or not, I had come up with it just because of my own superstitions but the results 
show that I was not the only one who considered the possibility that there is a difference.  
 
 
(Figure 20 Question Four) 
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5.5 Question Five – How secure is contactless payment in your opinion? 
The fifth question was conducted to get an overall view of people’s opinion about the se-
curity of NFC payment methods. In this question, there were four options: Very secure, 
somewhat secure, somewhat unsecure, very unsecure. The options were made vague to 
represent the percentage limits as quarters. In this question the person could answers 
only option.  
 
5.5.1 Analysis of the results 
The majority of people think that NFC payments are somewhat secure. The result was ex-
pected for the knowledge of an average person on NFC security issues is not that broad. 
Overall 56.90% of people chose somewhat secure as their answer. Quite surprisingly 
3.45% chose very unsecure as their option and it could be explained to be due of all the 
headlines about security issues on credit cards that have been published lately.  
 
 
(Figure 21 Question Five) 
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5.6 Question Six – The biggest security risk in contactless payment? 
The question was conducted partially to test whether people know the different possibili-
ties they can fall victim to fraud and to map the answerers consideration of the biggest se-
curity risks involving NFC. This question had three options to be chosen from, the person 
could choose only answer and the question involved a free form text field for other an-
swers. The three options were: Copying of the card information, Misuse of a stolen card 
and viruses and malware.  
 
5.6.1 Analysis of the results 
The most common answer was somewhat natural, 62.50% of the answerers chose the 
misuse of a stolen card as the biggest risk in NFC. And to be fair it is a big, but somewhat 
manageable risk. A person can use the NFC ability of a debit/credit card only for pur-
chases under 25€ and only 3 times within a short period before the reader requests a pin 
code. (Nordea 2017). Second biggest risk was identity theft or copying of card credentials 
which then could be used online for making larger purchases. 30.36% of people chose the 
latter option. From the free form fields one answerer said “All the above” which then again 
is pointless, because the question was about mapping the single biggest threat or risk. 
There are some other risks as well, but most relatively uncommon so I left the options out 
of this question.  
 
(Figure 22 Question Six) 
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5.7 Conclusion 
So, to draw some conclusion about the survey we need to analyse the group and margin-
alise the people in different categories. I will make divisions judging by the geographical 
aspects, age groups and then make an analysis out of those factors. The people who an-
swered the survey were all from Finland, 3 people from Oulu, 25 from Järvenpää and the 
rest from Helsinki. The age distribution varied from the youngest answerer who was 19-
years old to the oldest who was 53-years old, the average age rounded was 29-years old. 
Out of the 58 people who answered the survey about half were students and the other half 
in working life. Overall the distribution could’ve been broader but in the timeframe given 
there was enough variance.  
 
The analysis of use frequency and method types show that most people out of my target 
group use debit/credit cards as the main device for NFC payments, the most common 
place to use an NFC device to pay is the grocery store and most use NFC payments al-
most daily. 
 
To analyse how the average people who use NFC payment methods feel about the secu-
rity aspect of NFC I analyse the results through some follow up questions to some ran-
domly picked answerers. From the further discussions, I got the impression that media 
and news outlets are responsible as the main reason for the security threat fear, not any 
scientific or proven factors. This lead to the need to analyse the mainstream media news-
feed concerning NFC topics during the last 6-12 months and analyse which news might’ve 
affected people’s thinking the most and then go through from a scientific point of view 
what the news suggests. Is the news so called “fake news” or accurate?  
 
5.8 The news, examples of NFC stories 
Upon further investigation, I noticed there had been several news stories about the secu-
rity threats of NFC payment during the last years so I will go through two cases and a few 
more headlines. There are multiple other news stories from outside Finland but since the 
scope would be too wide I will only concentrate on the Finnish news stories.  
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5.8.1 Case: After Pay Bracelets 
In the summer of 2016 at the beginning of August there was held an event at Rautatientori 
in Helsinki called “small breweries, large beers”. The event launched a brand new paying 
method to be used throughout the festival that utilises NFC technology. The organizers 
distributed a “AfterPay Bracelet” to all the festival goers which included a NFC tag, meant 
to keep record of the “tab” of the visitors. So, to put it simply the festival goers could drink 
as many beers as they wanted and record everything with the AfterPay bracelet which 
was activated for each person using personal information details like social security num-
ber, home address etc. And then after the festival the invoice would be sent to the festival 
goers home address.  
 
The bracelets featured NXP MI FARE Classic 1k NFC tag and protocols but the design 
lacked some crucial features that you would normally find from a NFC abled debit card. 
The bracelets did not have any safety measures for copying, there was no double secure 
measures like pin code required and there was no limit set for the maximum sum that the 
bracelet could pay, so the bracelet owner could make purchases over 25e.  
 
The misuses were done by using cheap 1€ NFC tags that anyone can buy from China for 
example and a normal android phone that has an NFC tag built in. The way that some 
misuse was carried out was that the copier/misuser could copy the information from an-
other person’s bracelet using an NFC application on the android phone and selecting the 
copy option. After the copy process was done, which would take approximately few sec-
onds the information from the victim’s bracelet were than pasted on to the Chinese NFC 
tags, which then could be hidden and glued under the misuser’s bracelets, only then the 
misuser wouldn’t have been using his own tab, but charging the victims tab all the time. 
The victim would’ve only find out about the misuse after the event when receiving the in-
voice. The security risk was first reported by Harry Sintonen on his blog (Sintonen 2016) 
and later brought to larger audiences by Ilta-Sanomat’s format Talous sanomat (IS 2016). 
 
 
(Figure 23 an AfterPay bracelet) 
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5.8.2 Case – Crowded trains and successful payment with a closed card 
On the 30th of April in 2016 Oululehti published a story where a man from Oulu had tried 
and succeeded in charging his debit card after the debit card had been terminated. 
(Oululehti 2016). In the story the man from Oulu is left unnamed so we’ll call him Seppo. 
Seppo had a standard visa debit/credit card in use, which he had terminated. Disregarding 
of the termination Seppo tried to see if the cards contactless payment still works and it did. 
The card had originally been terminated by Seppo himself because of fear about a scim-
ming attack on his card at a local gas station.  
Because of the incident Seppo contacted Oululehti, a regional news outlet in Oulu and 
which then contacted a “team leader” in OP, Osuuspankki. Pekka Nummela from Osuus-
pankki described that what had happened is not out of the ordinary, but then continued to 
state that “Contactless payment on the debit side is very restricted”. (Pekka Nummela 
Oululehti 2016). By which he meant that the security measures of contactless payment do 
not allow purchases over 25 euros without the pin code of the card. Even though the limit 
is set at 25 euros the scammer can still perform multiple under 25 euro purchases thus 
raising the overall sum much higher. In the legal perspective, the card holders’ own re-
sponsibility (omavastuu in Finnish) limit ends at 150 euros of damage, and after that it is 
the banks responsibility to cover any damages. That is the scenario if the card holder has 
not personally terminated his or her card. If the card is terminated at the moment the card 
holder notices its gone missing etc. The banks responsibility starts.  
 
So, what’s the technical side to the story, why is it possible to use contactless payment 
even after the card has been terminated? The reason is in the chip of the bank card. The 
NFC antenna is imbedded in the chip of the bank card and still remains operational even 
after the termination of the card because it only uses NFC technology and does not need 
to verify and transactions or has a need for internet connection. This means that basically 
every time a user gets a new card and leaves the old card laying around it is a security 
hazard. Every missing card can be a security hazard as well. This is why all the banks al-
ways instruct the users to physically terminate the cards as well by cutting through the 
chip of the card with scissors thus making the chip un-operational.  
 
This leads us into the other case of crowded trains. Now there are multiple stories of 
POS’s being used and scanners being used to steal card information and to make small 
purchases to unaware commuters (as in the relay attack scenario described earlier). One 
of these stories was published by Iltalehti on the 2nd of February 2017, where a developer 
of a physical card protection device (wallet) Timo Äärinen demonstrates how to easily 
scan the card information from a victim in a crowded area. In all simplicity skipping the 
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technical aspects the attack is done very similarly to relay attack where the victims card is 
scanned and the data processed with a mobile phone application. The interesting differ-
ence is that Pekka Nummela the team leader in OP from the previous news story argues 
that “it is not possible to find out the CVC/CVV number with these scamming methods” 
(Pekka Nummela Oululehti 2016). Clearly indicating that NFC is not a security risk in card 
information scanning. And this seems to be the popular opinion of bank representatives in 
general judging by comments in other stories and also in VISA’s official web page as well 
(Visa 2017). But in the Iltalehti story Timo Äärinen shows that it is simple to find out the 
security codes (CVV/CVC) with an app that tests the options one by one. To be fair there 
are only 1000 possibilities for the security code since the CVV/CVC number is a three-
digit number. The danger lies in the fact that a lot of these attacks can be automated thus 
denying the bank representatives claims about that the attacks aren’t convenient for the 
attackers because of the effort to profit ratio. The danger is also the fact which a security 
manager at Nixu Niki Klaus claims “the user has no possibility to know whether his card 
has been scanned or not” (Iltalehti 2017). There are some possibilities to prevent falling a 
victim and one is to purchase or manufacture a physical protection around the card using 
tinfoil or making the purchase from any web store that sells the products such as: 
Lompakkoshop.fi (http://www.lompakkoshop.fi/lompakot/rfid-suojattu-lompakot.html).  
 
 
(Figure 24 a NFC scanning protected metal case wallet from lompakkoshop.fi) 
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Discussion 
5.9 Discussion and conclusions  
 
It would seem obvious that there are some known and some unknown security threats in 
the field of NFC payment as the study and the multiple cases and studies would indicate. 
The study shows that the security threats that the providers of the NFC payment devices 
and services tell on their web sites (Nordea 2017) are merely the tip of the ice berg as a 
figure of speech out of all the possible security threats there are. It is also a valid assump-
tion that the developers of security threats or attacks work faster paced than the people 
working on making NFC more secure. This can be said even though as some of the cites 
from the previous studies show; that there are computer scientists that also try to find vul-
nerabilities in order for the security personnel to be able to work on them and to improve 
the security of NFC (Charlie Miller, J. Vila & Rodriguez).  
 
Now one thing that cannot be stated as a 100% fact, but an assumption that I can confi-
dently hint towards is that; not all security threats are being made aware to the consum-
ers. This claim is supported by the multiple bank personnel interviews on the cases gone 
through on this thesis i.e. saying that scenario A is impossible even though there’s a clear 
report that scenario A has happened, and only stating the information that is available on 
any banks web site like in the case of Pekka Nummela from Osuuspankki claiming that 
scanning the bank card details is useless for the attacker because there’s no way to find 
out the CVV/CVC numbers and Timo Äärinen showing, just how it actually is possible. 
Also as my survey study indicated, not that many people think that the NFC payment 
method is bullet-proof or even relatively safe. Out of all the 58 people that answered my 
survey I found out that 89% use NFC Payment with the bank card, one of the most haz-
ardous devices and that the most common frequency of use was 1 – 6 times a week. Out 
of the 58 people almost 38% thought that the security of a portable POS is not as safe as 
a static POS, even though there wasn’t an option to explain why. Later studies indicated 
that the news stories, also gone through in the cases in the thesis have had an impact on 
the answers with a high probability. This also mirrored to the fact that approximately 29% 
of the answerers thought of NFC payment to be relatively or very unsecure. And the high-
est risk scenario for the consumer was the misuse of a stolen card. Even though the 
banks websites state that the POS will ask the Pin-code of the card after making a couple 
of NFC Payments thus limiting the maximum damage to approximately 75€ instead of the 
other option if one’s card details get copied and the victim could have his or her whole ac-
count drained.  
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Considering the results of the thesis it’s possible to make the correlation between the con-
sumer’s trust in the service, the information available on the banks websites, the news 
stories and the studies. It would seem that there has been too many news about the secu-
rity threats compared to what service providers inform that the consumers trust on the se-
curity of NFC payment is not that high, nor it in my opinion should be. This is just my opin-
ion but I feel it could be because as a product and a service, NFC payment is new in Fin-
land (first NFC Payment bank cards came available in 2013, korttiturvallisuus.fi), and has 
been lobbed and promoted so fiercely that the benefits of the fine service have overshad-
owed the security threats there are in the public and in the service providers eye. Whether 
the neglecting of the studies that indicate the security threats have been intentionally gone 
unseen or not, is something that would need further investigating. 
 
To the question: what is the future of NFC payment? I would guess that the technology 
will be more and more common on mobile devices in the future. And there are many rea-
sons why I think so. First; the possibility of MasterCard and Visa to become just service 
providers and eliminate the need to produce plastic, physical cards to customers would be 
a noticeable cut in expenses thus making it possible for the profit to be further directed to 
shareholders, or to develop the business and services. Even though the manufacturing 
expenses of a single bank card is not that high (0.50 US) (Finance Buzz 2016) there are 
over 1 billion bank cards manufactured every year in the United States alone (Finance 
Buzz 2016) making the savings of the expenses grand. The other reason why I predict 
such trend is that the traditional bank card is more vulnerable for attacks than a mobile 
phone, which can have a physical and a digital virus security and a firewall. It will indeed 
be interesting to see how the technology develops.  
5.10 Follow-up Research & Possible topics 
I think that especially since NFC payment is already relatively widely used in Finland that 
it would very beneficial to further examine the security threats and aggressively bring the 
facts to public knowledge. I don’t think that there should be any limitations made to the ex-
panding use of NFC as a payment method mainly because compared to pin code pay-
ment and the use of magnetic strip it is the better option, but just making people aware 
would help to decline the misuse statistics. For example, when looking on the case of re-
lay attacks previously on this thesis, it’s obvious that using a phone case with a bank card 
slot is a security threat of which many don’t know anything about.  
 
So, all-in-all there should be separate further research on the security threats on the tech-
nical side and there should be a further separate research, maybe in the form of surveys 
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or questionnaires like the one I conducted but in a much larger scale. That way the two re-
searches would benefit of each other’s results thus improving the security and the aware-
ness of the end consumer. And I think that those are the two most obvious directions 
where to expand this study. On the technical side, many of the experiments that I cited 
were conducted in laboratory environments so it would be also good to experiment on ac-
tual scenarios with modern devices. It would seem that the attacks do work though as 
stated in the news stories. Basically, my thesis covers a bit of both sides of the research 
but it would be beneficial to have two separate researches as well.  
 
Then again for the not so faint hearted there could lay a research on the honesty and in-
forming policies of the service providers, but that is more of a job for a journalist. For the 
possible topics, there could simply be a research of practical NFC attacks, theoretical 
NFC attacks and both done to multiple devices. And on the theory side; The current 
awareness of NFC threats of the end user or just a trust factor analysis of the end users 
titled, Does the consumer trust in NFC security. The latter would be really beneficial for 
marketers and campaign workers I’m sure, since my study already indicated that the trust 
is not that high.  
5.11 Thesis evaluation & Working methods 
When I chose the topic for this thesis I had the image in mind that I wanted to conduct 
such studies that I cited in the thesis later. It quickly came apparent that the costs without 
a sponsor and the timetable would’ve proved to be too challenging so the focus point 
shifted a bit, but in my opinion not to worse. As I studied the security threats there are and 
the statistics and information about the successful attacks it came to me as a shock at first 
that why wasn’t I aware of these factors, and the question also came to my mind that if I’m 
not aware of these threats how about the consumer of the service. I thought that surely 
since I work in banking my knowledge should exceed the knowledge of a person not in the 
industry, thus raising the urge to conduct a survey research. The amount of knowledge I 
gained in the process of conducting this thesis is so great that I will continue to work 
amongst NFC technology as a hobby, for example I have ordered my own devices and 
aim to improve the security of NFC furthermore. Overall I am really satisfied on the fact 
that I chose NFC Payment and security threats as my topic, for I had a great interest to-
wards subject beforehand and now I know a lot more than the average person, and this 
also gives me an advantage in my career as well since in hours I have worked on the sub-
ject more than an average worker at say my workplace. Whether my thesis brings value to 
any company in any field of business remains to be seen, but I can proudly present my 
knowledge and my piece of work if an opportunity rises.  
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In any other way rating or reviewing my own thesis is troublesome for me since I have a 
really objective view on the piece of work. I’m also as a reviewer hard on myself, and I 
have a motto that everything can always be improved. So as neutrally as I can I would say 
that my thesis is slightly above average but wouldn’t fit the bill of receiving any honours for 
even I feel that I could have researched a bit better and a bit further. Overall I think that 
the structure is simple and clear and that it supports the overall idea of the thesis. I think 
that all the chapters are necessary and no piece of information is useless. In a way if I’d 
have to say one developing point or a con in this thesis it would be that sometimes it was 
hard to stay in scope, because so many i.e. technological sides could’ve been gone 
through in much higher detail, but I think I managed well to keep everything relevant.  
 
As for my working methods, I feel that my working style was intensive and independent. 
Intensive because I work best under a bit of pressure, this time provided by deadlines and 
my challenging schedule. And independent because of my status of full time employment, 
which meant that me and my thesis advisor communicated mostly via email and that I 
didn’t need guidance in any of the thesis process phases like studying, writing etc. Overall 
I feel that this method of working suited me the best and all the praises for it was made 
possible.   
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